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Abstract: 
This paper examines the impact of the cultures and organisational structures of 
large law firms on individual lawyers' ethics. The paper suggests that large law 
firms in Australia should consciously design and implement 'ethical 
infrastructures' to both counteract pressures for misbehaviour and positively 
promote ethical behaviour and discussion. The paper goes on to explain what 
implementing ethical infrastructures in law firms could and should mean by 
reference to what Australian law firms are already doing and US innovations in 
this area. Finally, the paper warns that the 'ethical infrastructure' of a firm 
should not be seen merely as the formal ethics policies explicitly enunciated by 
management. Formal and legalistic ethical infrastructures that fail to support or 
encourage the development of individual lawyers' awareness of their own 
ethical values and ethical judgment in practice will be useless. 
 
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers often think about their own ethical behaviour as a matter of 
individual, independent judgment in the specific context of their own clients in 
their own situations.1 Professional conduct law reinforces this assumption - it 
is generally only individual legal practitioners who can be disciplined or 
otherwise held responsible for misconduct.2
Lawyers in Australia and around the world, however, increasingly work in 
organisations - large law firms, in-house corporate legal departments and 
government departments and agencies.
 
3 It is these organisational settings 
where much of the most socially and economically significant legal work takes 
place. Moreover, even within the law firm, much or most legal work is not 
done by individual lawyers but by teams of lawyers working under the 
leadership of one or more partners.4
                                                          
1 For critiques of this assumption see Robert Gordon, 'The Independence of Lawyers' (1988) 68 Boston 
University Law Review 1; David B Wilkins, 'Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in 
Legal Ethics' in Austin Sarat (ed), Everyday Practices and Trouble Cases (1998). 
 
2 Cf Note, 'Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline' (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 2236; Ted 
Schneyer, 'Professional Discipline for Law Firms?' (1991) 77 Cornell Law Review 1 (arguing for the potential for 
discipline of firms and work teams as well as individual lawyers). But note that in two jurisdictions in the United 
States (New York and New Jersey) there are rules allowing for law firm discipline: Hal Lieberman et al, 'How 
Should We Regulate Large Law Firms? Is a Law Firm Disciplinary Rule the Answer?' (2002) 16 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 203. There are also some situations where Australian law does recognise explicit or 
implicit obligations on law firms as firms. Since partners in firms have joint and several responsibilities for the 
actions of other partners and of employees, on rare occasions, regulators have sought the discipline of all of the 
partners for what seems to be the ethical failure of an employee: see, eg, Legal Services Commissioner v 
Devenish [2006] LPT 008. Liability can also attach to law practices for breaches of standards that, in effect, 
model the ethical commitments required of individual lawyers. These include, in particular, the liabilities 
imposed for tortious deceit, or for breach of trust or fiduciary duty. Further, a similar civil liability (through an 
indemnity or wasted costs order) can attach to the law practice as a whole for unethical conduct in the carriage of 
litigation: see The Hon Bill Pincus and Linda Haller, 'Wasted Costs Orders Against Lawyers in Australia' (2005) 
79 Australian Law Journal 497. See also below n 78 and accompanying text. There are now situations where 
Australian law recognises forms of vicarious ethical responsibility. In incorporated legal practices and 
multi-disciplinary partnerships, one lawyer has the formal responsibility for the introduction, supervision and 
monitoring of the practice's ethical systems according to legislation: see Model Bill (Model Provisions) - Model 
Laws Project (2nd ed, 2006) {'Model Laws') ss 2.7.10, 2.7.40, and below nn 62 to 64. The failure of an ethical 
system by the misconduct of another lawyer can presumably therefore be attributed to a senior practitioner: see 
Christine Parker, 'Law Firms Incorporated: How Incorporation Could and Should Make More Ethically 
Responsible' (2004) 23 University of Queensland Law Journal 347, 372. 
3 See, Note above n 2, 2336, 2339. In 2001-02 (the last year for which statistics are available) legal practices 
with 10 or more principals or partners in Australia employed 35.8 per cent (10 431) of the practitioners in private 
practice although they only made up only 1.2 per cent (91) of all practices in Australia: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 8667.0 Legal Practices Australia 2001-2002, Canberra, (2003) 21. 
4 See Kimberly Kirkland, 'Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism' (2005) 35 The University of 
Memphis Law Review 63 I; 'Collective Sanctions' above n 2, 2336, 2339. See also Robert E Rosen, '"We're All 
Consultants Now": How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of 
Corporate Legal Services' (2002) 44 Arizona Law Review 637. 
 
 This means that ethical behaviour is no 
longer only an individual matter. As this paper shows, individual decisions and 
behaviours are likely to be affected by a range of factors at both the 
organisational and work team levels that either support or undermine ethical 
behaviour. 
Since ethical behaviour in large law firms is influenced by the culture and 
organisational environment of the firm, it has been argued that law firms 
should consciously put in place 'ethical infrastructures' - formal and informal 
management policies, procedures and controls, work team cultures, and habits 
of interaction and practice that support and encourage ethical behaviour.5
The term 'ethical infrastructure' was originally coined in the United States to 
refer to policies and structures that support compliance with professional 
conduct rules.
 This 
paper examines whether large law firms in Australia should seek to design and 
implement ethical infrastructures. 
6
Second, the paper explains what implementing ethical infrastructures in law 
firms could mean, and sets out some ways in which Australian law firms 
already implement ethical infrastructures. The paper goes on to make some 
 In this paper we use a broader conception of ethical 
infrastructure that is concerned with positively promoting individual and 
corporate behaviours, structures and cultures that support the ethical values that 
lie behind the rules and laws that apply to lawyers. In our conception, law firm 
ethical infrastructures would likely be most effective where they ultimately 
aspire to equip and encourage each individual to develop and put into practice 
their own ethical values in dialogue with others in the firm, the profession and 
the broader community. As we argue in our conclusion, law firms with 
successful ethical infrastructures will need to understand ethics in broader 
terms than rule compliance. 
The paper first briefly describes the ways in which the large law firm context 
can and does impact on ethical and unethical behaviour by individuals - 
making a prima facie case for conscious design of ethical infrastructures within 
law firms, and setting out the types of unethical behaviour that ethical 
infrastructures might be able to counteract. 
                                                          
5 The term, 'ethical infrastructure' was coined by Ted Schneyer, 'A Tale of Four Systems: 
Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms' (1998) 39 South 
Texas Law Review 245. See also Schneyer, above n 2. It was further developed by Elizabeth 
Chambliss and David B Wilkins, 'A New Framework for Law Finn Discipline' (2003) 16 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 335; Elizabeth Chambliss and David B Wilkins, 'Promoting 
Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting' (2002) 30 
Hofstra Law Review 691, 692 (defining 'ethical infrastructure' as 'organizational policies, 
procedures and incentives for promoting compliance with ethical rules'). 
6 The use of the term 'ethical infrastructure' in the references cited in n 5 has focused on formal 
policies and structures explicitly designed to ensure compliance with professional conduct rules. 
As explained here and below n 52 and accompanying text, this paper argues for a broader 
conception of ethical infrastructure that incorporates informal management policies and work 
cultures (not just formal management policies), and the promotion of ethical dialogue and values 
(not just compliance with professional conduct rules). For another author who uses this broader 
conception of 'ethical infrastructure' see Milton C Regan Jr, Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall 
Street Lawyer (2004) 358-61. 
 
suggestions (based mainly on United States research) about what elements of 
ethical infrastructure large Australian law firms should consider adopting, and 
how ethical infrastructures might best promote ethical behaviour beyond mere 
compliance with the strict terms of conduct rules and other legal requirements. 
Further research is needed in order to determine to what extent, and in what 
circumstances, different forms of ethical infrastructure in large law firms might 
promote ethical behaviour in the Australian context. 
Third, the paper argues that the concept of ethical infrastructures for law firms 
has merit if, and only if, those infrastructures can interact with other 
countervailing pressures and management initiatives within law firms to 
support ethical practice among work teams and individual lawyers. There is a 
danger that ethical infrastructure will simply amount to formal ethical 
structures that do not connect with informal work team cultures and individual 
lawyers' values in practice. The 'ethical infrastructure' of a firm should not be 
seen merely as the formal ethics policies explicitly enunciated by management. 
All management policies, priorities and initiatives - formal or informal, and 
explicitly stated or implicitly assumed - can either undermine or support ethical 
practice within a firm. Moreover, the lead partners, work cultures and 
'taken-for-granted' practices in each work team within a large law firm will 
usually have a crucial influence on any individual lawyer's ability to identify 
ethical issues, resolve them satisfactorily and put their ethical judgment into 
practice. Large law firm ethical infrastructures that fail to connect with the 
diversity of work units within the firm will be of limited use. 
 
II    THE IMPACT OF THE LAW FIRM CONTEXT ON INDIVIDUAL 
LAWYERS' ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR 
There has been a plethora of commentary and scholarship over the last 20 or 30 
years exploring instances of illegal, unethical or, at least, questionable 
behaviour by commercial lawyers, and their clients with the help of the lawyers 
they retain. Although the main focus has been on US lawyers7, there have also 
been some well publicised examples of behaviour by Australian large law firm 
lawyers that commentators have labelled unethical.8
This questionable or unethical behaviour falls into two main categories. First, 
there are instances where lawyers and their firms allegedly breach their ethical 
and legal obligations to their own clients by acting despite conflicts of interest, 
or with dubious attempts at managing conflicts of interest.
 
9
                                                          
7 For overviews of US research in this area see John M Conley and Scott Baker, 'Fall From Grace or Business as 
Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street' (2005) 30 Law & Social Inquiry 783; 
Milton C Regan and Jeffrey D Bauman, Legal Ethics and Corporate Practice (2005). For further detail, see 
below nn 9 and 11. 
8 See Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers' Ethics (2007) 212-42. For further detail, see below nn 
9 to 13 and accompanying text 
 Commentary, and 
9 For examples from the US see Regan, above n 6; cf Susan P Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties: Conflict of Interest in 
Legal Practice (2002). For Australia see Adrian Evans, 'The Business of Conflicts: Reflections on the IBA 2000 
judgments, have suggested that many larger law firms' policies for deciding 
whether to act in potential conflict situations and their use of information 
barriers for when they do so may be inadequate.10 Other commentators have 
pointed to widespread habits of overcharging and over-servicing clients in 
larger law firms. 11
Second, there are situations in which lawyers may have breached legal and 
ethical obligations to the courts, the fair operation of the legal system and the 
public by assisting their clients in the commission or cover-up of illegal or 
unethical behaviour,
 
12 and the design of 'creative compliance' strategies for 
avoiding and evading legal obligations.13
                                                                                                                                
Debate Surrounding "Conflicts of Interest'" (2000) 74( 10) Law Institute Journal 23; Parker and Evans, above n 
8, 161-6, 172-6. See also Richard Tur, 'Confidentiality and Accountability' (1992) 1 Griffith Law Review 73. 
10 See Adrian Evans, 'A Mutuality of Interest' (2003) 77(7) Law Institute Journal 86; Steve Mark, 'Conflict of 
interests: A central issue for legal practice' (2003) 30 Without Prejudice 3. Cf Law Society of New South Wales 
in consultation with Law Institute of Victoria, Information Barrier Guidelines (2006). On information barriers 
see Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 AC 222; Andrew Mitchell, 'Chinese Walls in Brunei: Prince 
Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG' (1999) 22(1) University of New South Wales-Law Journal 243; Lee Aitkin, '"Chinese 
Walls", Fiduciary Duties and Intra-Firm Conflicts - a Pan-Australian Conspectus' (2000) 19 Australian Bar 
Review 116. 
11 For the US see Lisa G Lerman, 'Gross Profits? Questions About Lawyer Billing Practices' (1994) 22 Hofstra 
Law Review 645; Lisa G Lerman, 'A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing Fraud Versus 
Misappropriation' (2006) 34 Hofstra Law Review 847. For Australia see Legal Fees Review Panel, Discussion 
Paper: Lawyer's Costs and the Time Billing (2006); Parker and Evans, above n 8, 195-9, 209-10; Adam 
d'Andreti, 'Forum: Stopping the Clock? The Future of the Billable Hour - Foreword' (2004) 27 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 198,198-249. The 2005 ABC drama Hell has Harbour Views (30 January 2005, 
8:30pm) based on Richard Beasley's novel of the same name (2001) includes much dark comedy on the effects of 
some law firm approaches to fee generation, referring in one segment to a grasping associate whose progress was 
assured because he had billed 25 hours in one (24 hour) day. 
12 For the US see Susan P Koniak, 'Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers' (2003) 26 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 195; Milton C Regan, 'Teaching Enron' (2005) 74 Fordham Law Review 1139; William H Simon, 
'Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct' (2005) 22 Yale Journal 
on Regulation 1; Eli Wakl, 'Lawyers and Corporate Scandals' (2004) 7'(I) Legal Ethics 54. See also the fictional 
accounts of lawyer criminality in various popular movies that draw on general assumptions about the culture of 
large law firms: Michael Clayton (Warner Bros, 2007) and The Pelican Brief '(Warner Bros, 1993). A recent 
example in Australia of conduct that may fall into this category is McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia 
Ltd [2002] VSC 73 where lawyers allegedly provided advice about destroying documents relevant for tobacco 
litigation and then assisted in covering up the fact they had been destroyed, and also used various tactics to drag 
out proceedings brought by a plaintiff who was dying of cancer: Australian Law Reform Commission, Client 
Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies: Discussion Paper 73 (2007) 395-6; Camille Cameron, 'Hired 
Guns and Smoking Guns: McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Ltd' (2002) 25 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 768. Another alleged example is the way that lawyers for the Australian Wheat Board 
claimed privilege over a range of documents that were later found not to be privileged in an attempt to avoid 
disclosing the full extent of illegal conduct to an official inquiry: Australian Law Reform Commission, ALRC 
Report 107: Privilege in Perspective: Client Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations (2008) 490-1; Barbara R 
Mescher, 'The Business of Commercial Legal Advice and the Ethical Implications for Lawyers and Their Clients' 
(2007) Journal of Business Ethics; Parker and Evans, above n 8, 221-2. 
 
13 Doreen McBarnet, 'Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance' in Maureen Cain and Christine B 
Harrington (eds), Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (1994) 73; Christopher .1 
Whelan, 'Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice' (2007) 54 
Buffalo Law Review 1067. A recent Australian example that might fall into this category is the James Hardie case 
where in-house and law firm lawyers were involved in a scheme to move the James Hardie company offshore and 
into a separate legal entity in order to avoid paying out any more than a set amount of damages to asbestos 
victims of its former subsidiary companies: Suzanne Le Mire, 'The Case Study: James Hardie and its Implications 
for the Teaching of Ethics' in Bronwyn Naylor and Ross Hyams (eds), Innovation in Clinical Legal Education: 
Educating Lawyers for the Future (2007) 25; Parker and Evans, above n 8, 236-41. See also Gideon Haigh, 
In some cases lawyers have arguably breached ethical obligations in both 
categories because they have prioritised the interests of corporate management 
(the individuals who usually make the decisions about hiring and firing 
external lawyers) over both their duty to the court and the law and their duty to 
their true client (that is, the corporation as a whole).14
It would be remarkable if Australian large law firm lawyers never behaved 
unethically. Although most probably behave ethically all or most of the time, 
there will always be some people who will do the wrong thing out of greed, 
laziness, or ignorance. This paper concerns the ways in which law firm cultures 
and structures can not only precipitate, but also needlessly amplify unethical 
behaviour.
 
15 There is no doubt that individual lawyers' values, skills and 
capacity for ethical discernment are very important in influencing ethical 
behaviour. 16
The effect that organisational structure has on the actions of individuals in 
business and governmental organisations has long been recognised by 
sociologists,
 However, law firms and work teams structure and frame 
individual lawyers' ethical decisions and behaviours in three main ways: 
(a)  by limiting individual lawyers' capacity to 'see' ethical issues; 
(b)  by  constraining or creating  options  and  opportunities  for individual 
lawyers to make ethical judgments and act on them; and 
(c)  by creating internal incentives, or magnifying external ones, that pressure 
individual lawyers to choose certain ethical behaviours. 
We explain and give some examples of each of these below. 
17 psychologists,18 and management scholars.19
                                                                                                                                
Asbestos House: The Secret History of James Hardie Industries (2006). Australian lawyers have assisted their 
clients to 'creatively' comply with their tax obligations: see John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice: Markets in Virtue 
(2005) 6, 37, 43, 48, 110-1. See also Doreen McBarnet, 'When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem: 
From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude' in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy: Understanding 
Tax Avoidance and Evasion (2003) 229. 
14 Le Mire, above n 13 (arguing in the context of the James Hardie case that the lawyers acted in accordance 
with management imperatives and that these were ultimately not in the client's best interests). See also Parker and 
Evans, above n 8, 228-9; William H Simon, 'Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An 
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict' (2003) 91(1) California Law Review 57. 
15 Michelle M Mello and David M Studdert, 'Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individual and System 
Factors in Causing Medical Injuries' (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 599, 610-3. 
16 Josephine Palermo and Adrian Evans, 'Relationships Between Personal Values and Reported Behavior on 
Ethical Scenarios for Law Students' (2007) 25 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 121. 
17 See, eg, Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (1989); Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: 
Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002) 32—7; Diane Vaughan, 'Rational Choice, Situated Action, and 
the Social Control of Organizations' (1998) 32 Law & Society Review 23. 
18 Albert Bandura, Gian-Vittorio Caprara and Laszlo Zsolnai, 'Corporate Transgressions Through Moral 
Disengagement' (2000) 1 Journal of Human Values 57; Kath Hall, 'The Psychology of Corporate Dishonesty' 
(2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 268. 
19 M David Ermann and Richard J Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of 
Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society (5th ed, 1996); Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of 
Corporate Managers (1988). 
 Research 
demonstrates that bureaucratic corporate structures influence the ethical vision 
of those within them. With the rise of the large law firm these insights are 
being applied to the effect of law firm context on lawyers. 20
the attorney often is not an independent moral agent but an employee with 
circumscribed responsibility, organizational loyalty, and attenuated client 
contact... Under such circumstances, professional ideals that presuppose 
personal autonomy and public responsibilities may prove difficult to reconcile 
with the internal dynamics of employing institutions.
 Rhode notes that 
21
A simple example is compliance with rules prohibiting acting for a client 
where there is a conflict of interest. Within a large, multi-state law firm no one 
individual lawyer will personally know whether any other lawyer in their firm 
is acting (or has acted) for a client in a related matter adverse to the proposed 
client, or whether any other lawyer in the firm has any other interest that might 
conflict with the duty to the new client.
 
In the remainder of this part of the paper we outline what this research is telling 
us about how law firm context can and sometimes does influence the ethical 
behaviour of lawyers for the worse. In the second part of the paper we critically 
examine how law firms could and should use ethical infrastructure to 'design 
out' structural and cultural incentives for unethical behaviour, and promote 
ethical dialogue, behaviour and outcomes. 
 
A      Capacity to See Ethical Issues 
The fact that within a large law firm there are many lawyers in different cities, 
sections and teams working for different clients means that no one individual 
lawyer in the firm will necessarily have all the information to identify 
situations where they might be about to behave unethically. They will not 
necessarily have the capacity to 'see' ethical issues as they arise. 
22
work teams. Since individual lawyers will tend to specialise only on small parts 
  For this reason most law firms now 
have sophisticated computerised conflicts checking systems to act as an 
organisational memory so that lawyers can begin to 'see' (by checking the 
system) whether taking on a new client may create an ethical problem. 
A more subtle ethical consequence of the large law firm context is that work 
for one client will often be shared out among a number of individuals or even 
                                                          
20 See, eg, Sharon Dolovich, 'Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of integrity' (2002) 70 Fordham Law Review 
1629, 1670 (application of psychology to lawyering); Kim Economides and Majella O'Leary, 'The Moral of the 
Story: Toward an Understanding of Ethics in Organisations and Legal Practice' (2007) 10(1) Legal Ethics 5 
(applying organisation and management studies to ethics in law firms); Kirkland, above n 4 (applying 
management research to ethics in law firms); David Luban, 'Integrity: Its Causes and Cures' (2003) 72 Fordham 
Law Review 279 (applying psychology to lawyer ethics); Milton C Regan, 'Risky Business' (2006) 94 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 1957 (applying management research on compliance systems to law firms); Tanina 
Rostain, 'Waking Up from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment and The Practice of 
Justice' (1998) 51 Stanford Law Review 955, 964-6 (applying sociological research to ethics in law firms). 
21 Deborah L Rhode, 'Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice' (1984) 37 Stanford Law Review 589, 590-1. 
22 Since, if one lawyer in a firm is affected by a conflict of interest then all lawyers in that firm are affected 
unless, in some circumstances at least, both clients give their fully informed consent and an adequate information 
barrier is put in place. See Gino Evan Dal Pont, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility (3rcl edition, 2005) 165-7; 
Sandro Goubran, 'Conflicts of Duty: The Perennial Lawyers' Tale - A Comparative Study of the Law in England 
and Australia' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 88, 137-42. 
of work for a client, they may not be in a position to understand enough of the 
big picture to appreciate the ethical significance of their own work. For 
example, a junior lawyer asked to prepare one document that is part of a major 
transaction may never have met the client or been involved in strategy 
meetings. The junior lawyer may not therefore be in a position to find out that 
the document they are preparing is part of a scheme to shift assets from one 
corporate entity to another, and which is thereby defrauding creditors and 
employees.23  When information barriers are in place and rely on little more 
than personal undertakings, more senior lawyers may forget that they are 
constrained, and junior lawyers do not always ask them first if they are 
permitted to do something.24
Finally, and most seriously, where people work well together in teams, as in 
many large law firms, they will tend to develop shared ways of seeing their 
work and the world. This can be an important part of what helps them work 
well together, but it can also be dysfunctional where shared norms and cultures 
make people 'blind' to alternative world views and degrade their sensitivity and 
empathy to a range of different perspectives, values and concerns.
 
25 This 
sensitivity is an important aspect of being able to identify ethical issues as they 
arise. Lawyers who spend all their time with the same colleagues and clients 
can begin to see only the interests and values of their clients as significant. This 
is problematic because, although lawyers' duties to their clients are very 
important, they are not lawyers' only ethical obligations. In some cases, 
individual lawyers have felt so strongly aligned with the client and the work 
team that they no longer identified the ethical problems with conduct that the 
general public considered an unethical breach of the lawyers' duty to the court, 
such as devising creative legal strategies to avoid the spirit and intent of the 
law.26
Lawyers can also get so used to 'the way we do things around here', and the 
values exhibited by a particular leader or group, that they do not even think of 
ways in which others might think that these habits are unethical. For example, a 
litigation team might develop shared ideas about the sort of aggressive tactics 
that it takes to look after good clients and attract new clients. The 'goodness' of 
using these tactics becomes an almost unspoken, and unquestionable aspect of 
the culture of that team that all lawyers in the team are socialised into accepting 
-without even seeing alternative ways of handling litigation, or considering 
 
                                                          
23 For other examples and analysis of this type of problem see Robert E Rosen, 'Problem-Setting 
and Serving the Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence' (2001) 56 
University of Miami Law Review 179. 
24 Asia Pacific Telecommunications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350. 
25 See Dennis Gioia, 'Why 1 Didn't Recognise Pinto Fire Hazards: How Organisational Scripts 
Channel Managers' Thoughts and Actions' reprinted in Ermann and Lundman, above n 19, 139-57. 
26 See Luban, above n 20; Parker and Evans, above n 8, 222-4. 
alternative views on the ethics of what they do.27
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of 
action'.
 This has been labelled 
'groupthink' - 'a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply 
28  The development of a strong work team culture may be particularly 
ethically problematic where a work team is dominated by an individual (such 
as a lead partner) who takes an ethically questionable approach, where work is 
done exclusively for one or two clients whose work raises particular ethical 
temptations (such as tobacco companies), or where a large part of team income 
is derived from one client so that it is difficult to resist client pressure.29 There 
may be quite different ethical cultures within different work teams and some of 
these cultures may not reflect the ethical values that the firm as a whole would 
want to commit itself to.30
This gives the individual lawyers, who do the legal work for each client, little 
capacity to make sure they comply with their legal obligations in relation to 
costing and billing work, or to incorporate their own ethical judgments about 
what should be billed to the client or not. For example, a junior lawyer who is 
asked to prepare documents for discovery has little capacity to argue that the 
client should not be billed for all of her or his time on that file even though she 
or he might realise that most of the documents were in fact irrelevant to the 
 
 
B      Options and Opportunities for Ethical Judgment 
Where individual lawyers do see an ethical issue in their work, the large law 
firm context may constrain their options and opportunities to exercise their own 
ethical judgment to resolve the issue in what they consider to be an ethical way. 
A simple example is that the billing of clients will usually be handled by a 
separate administrative unit in a large law firm according to policies set by the 
whole partnership or senior management. The individual lawyers who actually 
do the work, and even in some cases the lead partner on the file, may have 
limited or no capacity to set their own charge out rates, to decide how many 
hours allocated on time sheets to client work should actually be billed to the 
client, or whether the matter should be costed by hourly billing at all. 
                                                          
27 See Robert L Nelson, 'The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional 
and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behaviour 
in Corporate Litigation' (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 113, 778-80. 
28Irving L Janis, Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 
(1972)9.  
29 See Peter Margulies, 'Lawyers' Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate 
Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime' (2006) 58 Rutgers Law Review 939, 973 (arguing that Enron's 
outside lawyers had such a close relationship with their client that they were less able to resist client pressure and 
see issues objectively). 
30 See Elizabeth Chambliss, 'The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates' (2005) 33 Fordham Urban 
law Journal 119, 150. 
litigation and wasting time.31
The fact that legal work for one client is often shared out among a number of 
lawyers can also make it difficult for any individual lawyer to take 
responsibility for responding to the ethical issues raised by that work. Unlike 
the examples given in section ITA above, an individual lawyer might see the 
big picture and its ethical implications but not be in a strong position to do 
anything about it since they are just one of many lawyers working for the 
client. This can cause particular problems for more junior lawyers supervised 
by lead partners who take the main responsibility for communicating with 
clients. But it can also be a problem whenever there are a number of lawyers 
working for one client. For example, one lawyer might see an ethical problem 
with the course a client wants to take, and draft a letter pointing this out to the 
client. However, in the Australian large law firm context, such a letter will 
inevitably be scrutinised by a more senior lawyer, and have to be signed by a 
partner, or a senior associate with signing authority, before it can be sent to the 
client. This standard procedure does see correspondence initiated by a junior 
lawyer modified or not sent at all and (largely as an essential aspect of the 
firm's risk management) it is meant to do just that. If these more senior lawyers 
do not see the ethical issue as a problem, or disagree with the junior lawyer's 
concern, then the concern is not likely ever to be conveyed to the client. The 
lawyer's ability to act responsibly according to his or her own ethical judgment 
is thereby undermined or thwarted. There may or may not be good reasons in a 
given case why the junior lawyer's view is not given to the client. But, 
regardless, it does mean that he or she does not have the capacity to take 
individual responsibility for his or her work.
 Beyond ensuring that they do not 'pad' the hours 
they record, individual lawyers have to rely on other staff who cost bills, and 
the firms' systems and policies under which they do so, to ensure that they 
fairly bill clients. 
32
Analyses of how things went wrong in cases of organisational ethics failures 
have concluded that sometimes the very fact that a number of individuals all 
work on different aspects of a project means that none of them feels it is their 
individual responsibility to raise ethical concerns about that project. Hence 
there may be a number of individuals who have knowledge of a particular 
ethical problem, and could do something to prevent it (eg, by expressing 
 
                                                          
31 For some examples from a fictionalised account of a young lawyer's time at a big US law firm, see Cameron 
Stracher, Double Billing: A Young Lawyer's Tale of Greed, Sex, Lies, and the Pursuit of a Swivel Chair (1998) 
91-4. 
 
32 It has been reported that one of the law firm lawyers for James Hardie did draft a letter setting out his 
concerns about the implications of the proposed strategy to 'separate' the parent company from its liability to 
asbestos victims in terms of whether it meant that they had earlier misled the court and the market. But while he 
was away on holiday, his colleagues revised the letter to take out his ethical concerns. Later, the same ethical 
concerns were expressed in community and media responses to the strategy. See Haigh, above n 13, 310-2. 
 
concerns to top management), but none do so because each feels it does not fall 
into their narrowly defined job description.33 Again, this is a particular danger 
for lawyers who might often (incorrectly) see their only job as achieving 
targets for billable hours and meeting client objectives.34
demand obedience and the surrounding culture supports their demand for 
obedience.
 
Some studies in the field of organisational psychology also point to 
subordinates' capacity to inflict harm on another person when authority figures 
35
Many of [the] incentive systems [that do operate in large law firms] seem to be 
actively working against peak ethicality. When large firm informants were 
asked to propose firm-level changes that would promote ethical practice, many 
of their suggestions involved abolishing counter-productive structures, not 
enhancing beneficial ones. Among the culprits: billing pressures (including the 
use of billable hours as an all purpose performance measure), competitive 
compensation, emphasis on rainmaking, and the favorable treatment of 
 
If there is no appropriate and powerful forum or person within the work team 
or firm where ethical queries can be raised and collectively resolved, then there 
is little capacity for individual lawyers working in teams and firms to choose to 
exercise ethical judgment. Indeed where a team works closely together on a 
day-to-day basis it can be very difficult for individuals to step outside of that 
shared culture and question the ethics of a particular practice or decision 
because the individual does not want to appear disloyal, 'rock the boat', or 
suffer the consequences of questioning the actions of those with whom they 
work. 
 
C      Incentives and Pressures on Ethical Behaviour 
The third and final way in which law firms can contribute to unethical 
behaviour by individual lawyers is through firm structures and cultures that 
create or magnify incentives for lawyers to behave unethically. These 
incentives can encourage lawyers who identify an ethical issue, and are 
perfectly capable of making and acting on an appropriate ethical judgment, to 
choose to ignore the problem and not exercise ethical judgment at all, or to act 
against their own 'better' judgment and not put their judgment into action. As 
one researcher concluded after studying the prevalence and causes of unethical 
behaviour in litigation among large law firm lawyers in the US: 
                                                          
33 Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations (1998) 
125-31 and generally on the 'problem of many hands'; Jeffrey S Slovak, 'The Ethics of Corporate Lawyers: A 
Sociological Approach' (1981) 6 American Bar Foundation Research Journal! 53. 
34 Slovak, aboven33. 
35 David J Luban, 'The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience' in Deborah L Rhode (cd), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers' 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation (2000) 94, 96-7 (referring to Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: 
An Experimental View (1974)). 
 
aggressiveness in evaluation ... The general sense seemed to be that, despite 
official policy statements, most firms were designed to reward behavior that 
was at best unrelated to ethicality, and at worst destructive of it.36
Junior lawyers often only reach success within law firms via patronage 
networks - that is they need to obtain good and steady work from senior 
partners, and ultimately have opportunities to develop close relationships with 
clients, and attract new clients. This means that younger lawyers will have to fit 
in with the values of their patrons. Based on her in-depth interviews with 
young commercial lawyers in the US, Kirkland found that this has deeper 
ramifications for young lawyers' capacity to develop ethical judgment in the 
long term.
 
Some of these incentives originate within the culture of the firm, while others 
also reflect the firm level response to the commercial pressures of 
contemporary legal practice. 
37 In large bureaucratic law firms, junior lawyers get used to 
working in an environment where the relevant norms change frequently 
depending on who is their supervising partner on each matter and the 
lawyer-managers in the firm. They work on the basis that 'the appropriate 
norms to apply in a given situation are those of the people the lawyer is 
working for and with at the time'.38 This encourages a morality characterised 
by 'organizational pragmatism rather than principled decision-making'.39 This 
morality is shaped by the requirement for survival and success within the firm 
and the need to please patrons - including partners within the firm and the 
client's legal services managers outside the law firm. Moreover, the 
competitive nature of the 'tournament' for promotion to full partnership among 
junior lawyers and salaried partners can create even greater temptation to 
behave unethically to succeed, quite apart from whether senior lawyers in the 
firm approve of such behaviour.40
According to empirical research, the compensation culture for employed 
lawyers and the systems for sharing out the profits between partners are two of 
the biggest incentives for unethical behaviour in relation to overcharging, 
over-servicing and other breaches of obligations to clients.
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36 Mark C Suchman, 'Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation' (1998) 67 
Fordham Law Review 837, 860. 
37 Kirkland, above n 4. 
38 Ibid 638. 
39 Ibid 640. See also Richard Wasserstrom, 'Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues' (1975) 5 Human 
Rights 1, 13. 
40 Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991). 
 Lawyers are 
41 Sec Susan Saab Fortney, 'Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and 
the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements' (2000) 69 UMKC Law Review 239; Susan Saab Fortney, 'The Billable 
Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points' (2005) 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 171 
(discussed below at text accompanying notes 44 ff); Lisa G Lerman, 'Blue-Chip Billing: Regulation of Billing 
and Expense Fraud by Lawyers' (1999) 12 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 205, 241, 266; Lerman 'A Double 
Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty' above nil; William G Ross, 'Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit' (1998) 50 
Rutgers Law Review 2199; William G Ross, 'The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys' (1991) 44 Rutgers Law 
financially rewarded almost solely on the basis of tollable hours generated or 
clients attracted to the firm. Thus Corbin's analysis of her interviews with 
junior and senior lawyers in Queensland law firms 'shows that the graduates 
feel pressured by firm culture, but more specifically budgetary policies, which 
in their view limit their ability to provide a quality service to clients. More 
disturbingly, they object to their firms' use of budgeting targets as a 
performance measure for promotional purposes.'42
In 2005 Fortney published a study of large US firms' charging (billing) 
practices based on interviews and surveys with 'managing attorneys' and 4600 
'supervised attorneys'.
 
43 Fortney hypothesised that a firm that imposed 
minimum billing targets would be likely to encourage a culture of 
overcharging, and 80 to 85 per cent of respondents confirmed that they worked 
in firms with minimum billing targets.44 Survey analyses revealed that the 
average number of billable hours required by different law firms of their 
lawyers (and also the average number of hours actually billed) increased with 
firm size.45 The larger the firm the higher the targets for billable hours they set 
for their employed lawyers, and the higher the number of hours those lawyers 
actually billed. Respondents were also clear that their prospects of both annual 
bonuses and promotion were directly linked to the extent to which they 
exceeded minimum billing targets.46
The 2000 billable hour requirement is an impossible task for an HONEST 
hardworking attorney. I am here every day at least 12 hours and NEVER take a 
lunch. But not everything is billable. I made my hours last year but did so only 
because I did not take a vacation. I HATE being an attorney! I have no life. I 
know that my colleagues regularly falsely elevate their time entries. They have 
to because they all take lunches everyday and leave at 5 or 6 every night.
 One respondent described the competitive 
disadvantage for an ethical practitioner as follows: 
47
This quotation captures the dilemma for ethical attorneys. If a firm largely 
bases compensation on hourly production, ethical associates who refuse to pad 
time may function at a competitive disadvantage when compared to associates 
who inflate their time. Based on study findings from my 1999-2000 empirical 
study on billable hours expectations and firm culture, I opined that a serious 
 
Fortney went on to comment: 
                                                                                                                                
Review 1. Cf Herbert M Kritzer 'Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical 
Literature Really Say?' (2002) 80 Texas-Law Review 1943. 
42 Lillian Corbin, 'How "Firm" are Lawyers' Perceptions of Professionalism?' (2005) 8(2) Legal Ethics 265, 
276-7. See also Matthew Coghlan, 'Young Lawyers Rebel Against Billable Hours', Australian Financial Review 
(Sydney), 4 August 2006, 1, 57. 
43 Fortney, 'Soul for Sale' above n 41. 
44 Ibid, 175. 
45 Ibid 176. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 178 (emphasis in original). 
deleterious effect of "quantifying" value may be the exodus of ethical 
associates who leave private law practice rather than rationalizing questionable 
billing practices.48
There is now increasing external competition among law firms to attract and 
retain clients. The degree of loyalty to the law firm has decreased with clients 
moving their legal work between several firms and corporate clients 
increasingly taking steps to control legal costs. These steps include the 
increased use of in-house legal services, 'beauty contests' between firms for 
new work, the pressure for legal services to be provided within a predetermined 
budget dictated by the client, and the increased supervision of legal services. 
 
49
Unethical behaviour might originate in complex behavioural interactions 
between lawyers in teams, the atmospherics or culture of the team,
 
These external commercial pressures are being reflected and magnified on 
large firm lawyers by the incentive structures inside the law firm. This is 
leading to law firm cultures where lawyers achieve partnership, financial 
rewards and social esteem by proving how aggressively they can represent 
clients in litigation, or in transactional lawyering, designing innovative ways to 
get around the law and protect partisan client interests. In some of the ethical 
scandals that have hit the headlines in both the US and Australia, it seems that 
the lawyers and law firms have acted in ways that were subsequently judged 
unethical by the public at least partly because of their financial dependence on 
particular clients and pressure to please them. Moreover, even if increasing 
commercial pressures increases the chances that just one or two 'rogue' lawyers 
in a firm will succumb, where the rogue lawyer is part of a team, especially a 
leader of other lawyers, then their own unethical behaviour will affect others 
too as they pressure or influence others to act unethically and cover up their 
own misconduct. 
 
D      Summary 
50
Diagram One graphically represents the way in which individual lawyers' 
values, skills and capacities interact with work team and law firm factors to 
 the 
bureaucratic systems of the law practice, and the internal and external pressures 
faced by the law firm and individual lawyer. It might also occur simply 
because of the size of the law firm and the fact that work for the one client is 
fragmented between individuals within teams and even spread across teams 
within the firm. 
                                                          
48 Ibid. See also Parker and Evans, above n 8, 195-9. 
49 See John Flood, 'Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic 
Transformation of Global Legal Practice' (1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 
169, 182; Rosen, above n 4. See also Robert L Nelson, 'Ideology, Practice and Professional 
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm' (1985) 37 Stanford Law 
Review 503, 507. 
50 Schneyer, above n 2, 6. 
influence the ethical character of lawyers' conduct. It indicates that the ethical 
behaviour of individual lawyers employed in large law firms is influenced by a 
number of different factors at different levels including firm culture, personal 
values, professional identity, client demands, work team supervisor's demands 
and so on. The ethical culture of the firm itself is made up of formal and 
informal elements (that is, both written policies and structures and informal 
habits and myths) and these are influenced by the individual lawyers within the 
firm, the external pressures they face from clients and their broader social and 
economic environment. Diagram One also indicates law firm structures and 
cultures are themselves (partially at least) responses to external pressures and 
demands that can affect lawyers' ethical behaviour for the better or worse. 
Finally, Diagram One includes a feedback loop from lawyers' conduct (on the 
right hand side) to the external pressures on law firms on the left hand side to 
indicate that the external pressures lawyers and their firms face will also be a 
response to how lawyers actually behave in practice. If unethical behaviour 
becomes more common, lawyers might expect governments and regulators to 
react with stronger regulatory controls. 
This is not something unique to law firms. There is a rich literature on the 
particular ethical problems that can arise from the influence of group dynamics 
and organisational factors in businesses, government organisations and any 
human grouping, and how our notions of law and accountability should expand 
to address the collective aspects of ethical responsibility.51
Since the organisational (law firm) context of legal practice has such an 
important influence on unethical behaviour, some commentators have 
suggested that law firms should consciously implement 'ethical infrastructures'. 
A law firm ethical infrastructure means formal and informal management 
policies, procedures and controls, work team cultures, and habits of interaction 
and practice that support and encourage ethical behaviour.
 
It is easy to assume that each individual lawyer's values, ethical discernment 
and personal capacity should empower them to act ethically even in the face of 
all these organisational and other pressures to behave unethically. But it is 
more realistic to recognise that individual ethical behaviour needs the support 
of organisational level bulwarks to counteract organisational level pressures for 
unethical conduct. In practice, many firms do indeed have at least some such 
supports, as we show in the next section. 
 
III THE VALUE OF ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
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51 See above nn 17-9. See also Bovens, above n 33; Christopher Kulz, Complicity: Ethics and Law 
for a Collective Age (2000). 
52 See Schneyer, above n 5. 
 It might include 
the appointment of an ethics partner and/or ethics committee; written policies 
on ethical conduct in general, and in specific areas such as conflicts of interest, 
billing, trust accounting, opinion letters, litigation tactics and so on; specified 
procedures for ensuring ethical policies are not breached and to encourage the 
raising of ethical problems with colleagues and management; the monitoring of 
lawyer compliance with policies and procedures; and, ethics education, training 
and discussion within the firm. 
 
In this part of the paper, we set out why conscious attention to developing an 
ethical infrastructure is necessary for the contemporary larger law firm, how 
large law firms in Australia and the US are already starting to adopt formal 
ethical infrastructures, and how these should further evolve. 
 
A      The Need for an Ethical Infrastructure to Evolve with the Large 
Law Firm 
It is becoming more necessary for law firms to formalise and systematise 
ethical infrastructures as they change and grow larger. In the past, when law 
firms were smaller, informal mechanisms of mentoring, socialisation and 
collegial discussions were the primary means by which junior lawyers were 
taught to meet their professional conduct obligations, and senior lawyers and 
partners were kept in check. This traditional 'professional partnership'53 model 
of law firm organisation could be quite effective at promoting ethical conduct 
by embedding lawyers 'within networks of social relations that provide ethical 
obligations, expectations ... information channels and social norms'.54
Recently, however, many large law firms in the US, UK and Australia have 
shifted to a 'managed professional business' model of organisation.
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53 John Flood, 'Resurgent Professionalism? Partnership and Professionalism in Global Law Firms' 
in Daniel Muzio, Stephen Ackroyd and Jean-Francois Chanlat (eds), Redirections in the Study of 
Expert Labour: Established Professions and New Expert Occupations (2007) 3; Ashly Pinnington 
and Timothy Morris, 'Archetype Change in Professional Organizations: Survey Evidence from 
Large Law Firms' (2003) 14 British Journal of Management 85. 
54 For empirical evidence that this type of embedding is effective at promoting ethical behaviour, see Bruce L 
Arnold and Fiona M Kay, 'Social Capital, Violations of Trust and the Vulnerability of Isolates: The Social 
Organization of Law Practice and Professional Self-Regulation' (1995) 23 international Journal of the Sociology 
of Law 321, 339 (law firm 'social capital' is a significant explanatory factor in lawyer misconduct). See also S 
Arthurs, 'Discipline in the Legal Profession in Ontario' (1969) 7 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 235 (solo 
practitioners are more likely to give unethical and unskilled service probably because they lack the collegial and 
financial support of those in larger firms); Eliot Freidson, Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social 
Control (1975) (informal social control among medical practitioners who work in group practice is effective in 
either changing their behaviour or influencing them to resign). 
55 Flood, above n 53, 3 (but Flood also notes that there can be elements of the traditional partnership model even 
in very large, commercially-oriented firms); Pinnington and Morris, above n 53 (but note that Pinnington and 
Morris also argue that this is not necessarily a complete 'archetype' change as elements of both models co-exist in 
the same firms). There is evidence that medium and large Australian law firms have been particularly quick to 
embrace bureaucratised management practices, at least compared with their counterparts in the UK: Ashly H 
Pinnington and John T Gray, 'The Global Restructuring of Legal Services Work? A Study of the 
Tnternationalisation of Australian Law Firms' (2007) 14 International Journal of the Legal Profession 147. 
 In law 
firms that operate as managed professional businesses, traditional, informal 
controls are much weaker and less able to inculcate a common culture 
including common standards of ethical behaviour. As Flood explains: 
For much of the 20n century making partner was a stable marriage, for life. But 
from the 1980s on law firms became more entrepreneurial and 
business-oriented leading to lawyers moving between firms more often and 
taking clients with them. Law firms now resemble interlocking networks of 
specialisms held together by competitions for resources, especially associates.56
The increasing degree of mobility in the upper end of the legal profession -that 
is, how quickly experienced lawyers move in and out of the firm - makes it 
difficult to transmit a positive ethical culture throughout a whole firm. It is 
particularly challenging where a whole work team moves from one firm to 
another, or a smaller firm (with its own culture) is swallowed whole by a larger 
one. This sort of mobility increases the chances of disparate ethical cultures in 
different work teams, and the emergence of 'rogue' work teams in which the 
culture encourages ethically problematic behaviour.
 
57 Similarly, the high 
degree of specialisation in the contemporary large law firm means that different 
partners and work teams can develop quite different norms and behaviour 
depending on their area of practice, and that partners in different areas of 
practice may have little opportunity to understand or find out what each other 
are doing and whether it meets firm-wide ethical standards.58
Mayson has argued that as law firms get bigger and staff specialise more, it is 
important for them to think explicitly about building up their 'organizational 
capital' as well as their financial, physical, human and social capital. The 
concept of' organizational capital' 'concerns the extent to which human and 
social capital are embedded in and supported by the firm through culture, 
collective reputation, communities of practice, strategic context, motivation, 
structure, contracts, routines, knowledge management, and systems'.
 
59 It 
belongs to the collectivity of the law firm, not to individual lawyers or work 
teams. As Mayson points out, 'organizational capital goes to the very heart of 
the firm's sustainability'.60 A firm without this kind of 'capital' is 'a more or less 
empty, fragile, and less valuable shell'.61
As we have seen, large law firms are increasingly using bureaucratic 
management practices that incorporate commercial pressure into legal practice 
 
                                                          
56 John Flood, 'Globalization and Large Law Firms' in Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford 
Companion to Law (forthcoming). See also Emmanuel Lazega, The Collegial Phenomenon: The Social 
Mechanisms of Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership (2001). 
57 See Chambliss, above n 30, 150; Nelson, above n 27, 777; David B Wilkins, 'Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 799, 827 (citing the increased size of law firms and greater mobility 
of lawyers as increasing the prevalence of conflicts of interest). 
58 For discussion of the negative impact of different ethical norms in different areas of practice in highly 
specialised law firms, sec Kirkland, above n 4; Regan, above n 6.. 
59 Stephen Mayson, 'Your Capital: Building Sustainable Capital: A Capital Idea' in Laura Empson 
(ed), Managing the Modern Law Firm: New Challenges, New Perspectives (2007) 141, 157. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
by, for example, requiring lawyers to meet certain billable hour targets, having 
client relations partners with the explicit job of ensuring that other lawyers 
(including other partners) are making clients happy, and implementing 
performance criteria and in-firm professional development all aimed at making 
sure lawyers meet client needs. If these new bureaucracies do not incorporate 
controls explicitly aimed at promoting ethical behaviour, they may in fact 
undermine ethical behaviour by putting pressure on lawyers to cut corners or 
do 'too much' for clients, and thereby undermine the value of the firm's 
'organisational capital'. 
Now that most Australian states allow legal practices to incorporate, and the 
first law firms are listing on the stock exchange, there is potential for even 
greater pressure on professional ethical responsibilities as incorporated legal 
practices adopt more commercial business structures, and encourage outside 
investors and non-lawyer staff to become shareholders in the law practice. 62 
For this reason the legislative provisions that allow law firms to incorporate 
also require incorporated legal practices to have 'appropriate management 
systems' in place to deal with ethical issues - in effect, a requirement that 
incorporated legal practices consciously implement an ethical infrastructure as 
part of their new business structure.63 The New South Wales Legal Services 
Commissioner has developed 'ten commandments' that incorporated legal 
practices' management systems must follow (see Appendix One) and a system 
for self-assessment and external audit as to how well incorporated legal 
practices are implementing them. The legal profession regulators have also 
been very concerned to make sure that potential ethical conflicts between 
duties to shareholders and professional ethical duties to courts and clients are 
dealt with.64
As law firm management and business structures evolve, 'a crucial question is 
whether law firms will be able to sustain a distinctive culture' that balances 
duty to client and duty to court 'rather than becoming purely market-driven 
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(unpublished); Parker, 'Law Firms Incorporated', above n 2. 
63 Model Laws s 2.7.9. One lawyer, the 'legal practitioner director', has responsibility for the 
introduction, supervision and monitoring of the practice's ethical systems. Model Laws, ss 2.7.9, 
2.7.10. For multidisciplinary practices (MDPs), see Model Laws ss 2.7.39, 2.7.40. See also Parker, 
above n 2, 372. 
64 This has extended to the NSW Legal Services Commissioner reportedly negotiating with Slater and Gordon 
to ensure that a statement as to the primacy of the incorporated legal practices' (ILP) duty to the court was 
included in its prospectus before it could list on the Australian Stock Exchange: Mark, above n 62. 
organizations'.65 This concern with the internal management structures within 
law firms is consistent with an increasing focus on similar structures within 
business firms to improve corporate ethics, social responsibility and regulatory 
compliance.66 Indeed many large commercial law firms in Australia have 
lawyers who specialise in advising their business clients on how to implement 
regulatory and ethical compliance systems and who sell educational and 
management tools to clients for this purpose.67 It is logical that large law firms 
might apply the same principles to themselves, and that regulators,68 insurers,69 
clients,70
For example, most law firms in Australia and elsewhere already recognise the 
need to have systems for checking for potential conflicts of interest before 
taking on a new client.
 and lawyers should all be interested in understanding and improving 
the ethical climate of law firms. 
B      The Beginnings of Ethical Infrastructure in Australian Law Firms 
Most Australian law firms, especially larger law firms, already recognise that 
some aspects of ethical infrastructure are desirable and necessary in some areas 
as a matter of good practice, although they may not have thought of what they 
do as 'implementing an ethical infrastructure'. 
71  This generally includes  screening  software  and 
regular circulation of new client lists.72 Most larger firms also have a system 
(usually a designated 'conflicts partner' and perhaps a conflicts committee) for 
deciding what to do where potential conflicts are identified. Most larger 
Australian law firms would also have firm-level infrastructure in place to 
comply with trust accounting and liability insurance rules,73 and systems 
designed to make sure they bill clients only in compliance with contractual and 
professional conduct requirements.74
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ethics partners etc: see Elizabeth Chambliss and David B Wilkins, 'The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
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Guidelines (2006) guideline 2. 
72 Susan Saab Fortney and Jett Hanna, 'Fortifying a Law Firm's Ethical Infrastructure: Avoiding Legal 
Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest' (2002) 33 Saint Mary's Law Journal 669, 689, 697. 
73 Existing legislation does recognise that law practices have ethical obligations including in respect of client 
money (Model Laws, s 3.3.5) and the insurance of client money in fidelity funds (Model Laws, s 3.6.9). 
 
74 The Model Laws obligate lawyers to provide, in great detail, written advice as to costs to clients at the 
Although Australian conduct regulation does not explicitly require law firms to 
have in place practices for making sure clients know who they can complain to 
and systems for receiving and resolving complaints,75 it is now seen as a basic 
requirement for any business to have a basic complaints handling system in 
place and to let customers know about it.76 Many larger firms also have 
sophisticated systems in which client relations partners are assigned to 
particular clients from whom they solicit feedback before any complaints 
become big issues. Many larger Australian firms have also implemented 
quality assurance programs to avoid malpractice liability.77
In Australia, however, there is no professional conduct obligation for legal 
practices, apart from incorporated legal practices and firms in 
multi-disciplinary partnerships, to have in place an overarching ethical 
infrastructure.
 
78 Such an initiative has not yet seemed sufficiently important to 
government, but this could change at short notice, especially in the wake of a 
scandal in which unethical conduct by large firm lawyers is uncovered. The 'ten 
commandments' framework for regulating appropriate management systems in 
incorporated legal practices (shown in Appendix One) are certainly an essential 
framework for competent and ethical practice that do go beyond the absolute 
basics to address the organisational factors that can lead to unethical behaviour 
in large law firms. But they are under-developed as yet.79
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77 Dal Pont, above n 22, 79. 
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supervise is mainly in relation to a lawyer supervising work that is done by others directly in relation to that 
lawyers' own clients. See Dal Pont, above n 22, 466, 568. In the US context sec Schneyer, above n 2; and 
Chambliss and Wilkins, 'Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure', above n 5. Both of these papers analyse the 
possibility of law firm discipline on the basis of the duty to supervise. Chambliss and Wilkins argue that law 
firms should be required to put in place an ethical infrastructure as a duty of management rather than just as part 
of the duty of individual lawyers to supervise individual employees. 
79 There is however some preliminary evidence that clients complain less about New South Wales ILPs than 
other firms because they have appropriate management systems in place: see Centre for Applied Philosophy and 
Public Ethics, Complaints and Self-Assessment Data Analysis in relation to Incorporated Legal Practices, Report 
prepared by Professor Seamus Miller and Mathew Ward for the New South Wales Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner (2006) (available upon request from the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner). 
 
 Existing quality 
assurance programs may have an ethical dimension, but are focused mainly on 
keeping clients happy, rather than ethical obligations, especially ethical 
obligations owed to the court and the law.80
There has been little reporting or research on the extent to which Australian 
law firms have implemented ethical infrastructures and what impact they have 
on ethical behaviour. Research in the US has suggested that most law firms 
there have inadequate structural controls in place - although larger firms are 
more likely to have some sort of ethical infrastructure.
 
81 Chambliss and 
Wilkins conclude from their review of all the available research82 that almost 
all law firms have formal procedures for identifying conflicts of interest, and 
'most firms have formal policies or procedures regarding directorships, 
trusteeships, and audit opinion letters'.83 Some US firms are developing 
specific and mandatory protocols to prevent liability triggered by breach of 
legislative rules such as insider trading.84
In the US over the last 10 years many larger law firms 'have begun to address 
the gaps in internal supervision by appointing individual partners to be 
specially responsible for monitoring compliance with professional regulation'
 For example, a firm policy might 
state that lawyers cannot invest in a client's business either without approval, or 
at all, and compliance with the policy is then monitored. But most firms lack 
formal procedures for addressing other ethical issues, such as the withdrawal of 
client funds, and do not have their own billing guidelines or training. Most 
periodically monitor compliance with firm conflicts procedures, but little is 
done to monitor compliance with other formal ethical requirements. No 
comparable studies have yet been undertaken in Australia to assess whether 
procedures like these are in place, and effective. 
 
C      Ethics Partners 
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80 Parker, above n 2, 377-8. 
81 Chambliss and Wilkins, 'Promoting Ethical Infrastructure', above n 5, 700. 
82 Ibid 697-9; Chambliss, above n 30, 127-8. Chambliss and Wilkins' summaries draw on their own work and 
four small scale surveys conducted between 1992 and 1999 by other authors: Susan Saab Fortney, 'Are Law Firm 
Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture' (1997) 10 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 271; Fortney, 'Soul for Sale' above n 41; Stephen R Volk, Arthur N Field 
and Joseph T McLaughlin, 'Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis 
of a Survey of Law Firms' (1993) 48 Business Lawyer 1567; Lee A Pizzimenti, 'Screen Verite: Do Rules About 
Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?' (1997) 52 University of Miami Law 
Review 305. 
83 Chambliss and Wilkins, above n 69, 7. See also Richard W Painter, 'Rules Lawyers Play By' (2001) 76 New 
York University Law Review 665, 732 (reporting that the New York provisions for discipline of law firms means 
that now firms are 'required to have a policy for checking proposed engagements against records of prior 
engagements to prevent impermissible conflicts. Many law firms voluntarily have adopted formal policies on 
issues such as assumption of corporate directorships, new clients and new matters, opinion letters, client 
conflicts, firm and personal investment, firm audits and client funds, record retention' etc). 
84 Mona L Hymel, 'Controlling Lawyer Behaviour: The Sources and Uses of Protocols in Governing Law 
Practice' (2002) 44 Arizona Law Journal 873. 
85 Chambliss, above n 30, 129-30. 
 
These specialists have a range of titles, including 'ethics advisor', 'loss 
prevention' or 'risk management partner', and firm 'general counsel', which do 
not necessarily correspond exactly with their actual role.86
After the McCabe case,
 
87 some Australian legal professional associations also 
encouraged law firms to appoint ethics partners and put in place more general 
measures to promote ethical discussion and 'reporting up' of potential ethical 
problems. In 2002 Kim Cull, then President of the Law Society of New South 
Wales, encouraged law firms to introduce 'ethics partners' and for the legal 
profession to protect whistleblowers within the legal profession.88 In the same 
year the Law Institute of Victoria launched a program for law firms to appoint 
'a partner or senior consultant to be the designated ethics practitioner' as a point 
of first contact for all solicitors in the firm with an ethical question or 
problem.89
The ethics specialist role within US law firms has mostly evolved from a 
person responsible solely for monitoring compliance with conflicts checking 
and screens into a broader role (although for many ethics specialists conflicts is 
still the main function).
 Some law firms have also hired ethics consultants to audit their 
ethical infrastructure and suggest changes in the wake of issues that have arisen 
in the media. 
90
they provide counselling on a wide range of issues, including conflicts 
and intake (which they list first); attorney-client privilege and work 
product; advertising and solicitation; communication with represented 
parties; lateral hiring and departure; fees, billing and trust accounts; 
mandatory and permissive withdrawal; and the duty to report 
misconduct by other lawyers. Moreover, in addition to individual 
counselling, [they] alert the firm to regulatory developments, help the 
firm develop standardized forms (such as conflicts waivers), provide 
in-house ethics training, publish a quarterly professional    
responsibility    newsletter,    maintain    intranet    and    
internet resources, and -when necessary - respond to bar complaints 
 Chambliss and Wilkins' description of a broader 
in-house ethics practice is a useful starting point for considering what an ethics 
partner could do to promote ethical behaviour: 
                                                          
86 Chambliss and Wilkins, above n 69. See also Elizabeth Chambliss, 'The Professionalization of Law Firm 
In-House Counsel' (2006) 84 North Carolina Law Review 1515. 
87 McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73. See also above n 12. 
88 Kim Cull, 'Ethics and Law as an Influence on Business' (2002) 40 Law Society Journal 50. 
89 John Cain, 'Good Ethics Requires Constant Vigilance' (2002) 76 Law Institute Journal 4, 4. See also Fergus 
Shiel, 'Push for Ethics Advisers at Law Firms', The Age (Melbourne) 6 September 2002, 7; Katherine Towers, 
'Ethics Standards Under Attack', Australian Financial Review (Sydney) 7 March 2003. The Law Institute of 
Victoria through its Ethics Committee said it would provide ongoing training for the ethics practitioners and 
started an Ethics Liaison Group as a direct result of that. 
90 Chambliss and Wilkins, above n 69, 566-7. 
 
and motions for disqualification.91
I have spent an awful lot of time developing our intranet site as an 
ethics and loss prevention library. We have links to every third party 
source I can find ... And then the materials I have created ... I have, 
say, an outline on each of the major rules of Professional Conduct and 
if somebody said, "well, what's the rule on such and such, can you 
contact a former employee under Rule 4.2," I may well have that on 
hand ... And then you're able to say to people, "here's the answer and 
here's why...".... If I did a job description I would have a section on 
systems monitoring and systems planning. That is, I spend a certain 
amount of time making sure our trust account is working the way it is 
supposed to ... We do a fair amount of non-lawyer ethics training too, 
and I think that's important ... because the people in marketing and 
trust accounts and so forth ... how do you know what is going on or 
what is not coming to your attention? ... Try getting all the secretaries 
in the firm together and tell them what proper notarization practice is, 
and see if you don't get a few phonecalls afterwards.. .
 
Chambliss and Wilkins illustrate this description by quoting the way one of the 
ethics partners they interviewed describes his own role: 
92
These descriptions of the role of an in-house ethics specialist clearly imply that 
a firm that takes its ethical infrastructure seriously might need to make the 
ethics partner a fulltime, specifically compensated position. In Australia, the 
largest law firms now have full-time coordinators for pro bono who are 
appropriately supported and compensated in their roles.
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Another trend evident in American law firms has been the appointment of firm 
general counsel to manage malpractice claims encountered by the firm.
 They also have 
systems for taking account of lawyers' pro bono work in calculating 'tollable' 
hours worked. It does not appear that Australian law firms have yet put the 
same amount of care into the role of the separate ethics (or often simply 
conflicts) partner. Yet having a compensated ethics partner position, and 
appropriate time sheet options for raising, discussing and receiving advice on 
ethical problems would be an important way for a firm to show how serious it 
is about ethical behaviour. If firm managers want lawyers to have the capacity 
to see ethical issues, and the opportunity to make and act on ethical judgments, 
then the firm needs to provide the time, resources and incentives for lawyers 
throughout the firm to be able to do so. 
94
                                                          
91 Ibid 566-7, summarising Peter R Jarvis and Mark J Fucile, 'Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice' (2000) 
14 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 103. 
92 Chambliss and Wilkins, above n 69, 574-5 (quoting one of their interviewees). 
93 National Pro Bono Resource Centre, Mapping Pro Bono in Australia (2007). See also Andrew Boon and 
Robert Abbey, 'Moral Agendas? Pro Bono Publico in Large Law Firms in the United Kingdom' (1997) 60 
Modern Law Review 630. 
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94 Susan Saab Fortney, 'Why Do Law Firms Need a General Counsel? The Changing Structure of American 
research suggests that it may be that more than two-thirds of the top 200 
American law firms have a general counsel.95 Law firms seem to be creating 
general counsel positions out of a concern for risk management in a climate 
where law firms are seen as potential targets for lawsuits, particularly in 
malpractice and employment law arenas.96 The general counsel is usually 
concerned with ethics only in a peripheral way, with the appointment of 
general counsel being a 'good business decision in terms of loss prevention, 
quality client service and lawyer satisfaction'.97
This indicates the danger that appointment of an in-house ethics specialist may 
morph into a formal position that is more about protecting the firm's finances 
and reputation than actually encouraging and supporting ethical dialogue 
within the firm. There is a tension between two different roles that might both 
be necessary in a well-managed, ethical law firm: on one hand is the ethics 
'guru' or 'rabbi' -someone who anyone in the firm can go to with ethical queries 
and problems and who can raise ethical issues with relevant people up and 
down the chain of management; and, on the other hand is the law firm general 
counsel/risk manager who provides advice to management on how to handle 
legal issues and prevent loss for the firm. Some US firms employ firm counsel 
to whom employee lawyers can go for help with external issues (for example, 
conflicts of interest) and also an ombudsman to deal with the concerns of 
associates about internal issues within the firm in a way that is more 
confidential to the individual with the concern (for example, complaints or 
concerns about a partner).
 
98
In relation to billing, mere compliance with legal obligations and contractual 
principles are not enough to inculcate ethical behaviour. The law is mainly 
aimed at making sure that the client understands and agrees to the fees to be 
 
 
D      Evolving Ethical Infrastructures 
It is not enough to have an ethics partner. Adequate ethical infrastructure would 
need adequate attention to a range of areas where ethical problems can arise. 
Two specific areas where research and commentary suggests that it might be 
particularly important for large law firms to think about ethical infrastructure 
beyond conflicts of interest are billing and litigation practices. We briefly 
discuss these two areas for illustrative purposes. 
                                                                                                                                
Law Firms' (2005) 53 University of Kansas Law Review 835. 
95 Studies cited in Chambliss, above n 30, at 131-·2. 
96 Fortney, above n 94, 846. 
97 Ibid 850. Sec also Douglas R Richmond, 'Why Do Lawyers Need a General Counsel? The 
Changing Structure of American Law Firms' (2005) 53 University of Kansas Law Review 805, 807 
(describing the appointment of general counsel as 'part of a good business model'). See also 
Anthony V Alfieri, 'The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management' (2006) 94 
Georgetown Law Journal 1909; cf William H Simon, 'The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge: 
Virtue and Risk Management' (2006) 94 Georgetown Law Journal 1985. 
98 Chambliss, 'The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel', above n 86. 
charged so that the firm can legally recover those fees if the client later does 
not pay up. But an ethical law firm would want to make sure the fees it charged 
were not only authorised by a properly constituted contract with the client after 
full disclosure, but also that the fees were actually reasonable in all the 
circumstances. 99 This would require attention to how differences in hourly 
charge-out rates are determined, communicated and justified to enquiring 
clients,100 whether there are any, and if so what 'padding' conventions are there 
within the firm. It would require using billing software that includes safeguards 
against double-billing and padding, and adequate, ethically sensitive bill review 
or double-checking procedures. A firm concerned with ethical billing, and not 
providing ethical disincentives to its lawyers, might also reconsider the need 
for hourly billing in all circumstances given its ethical implications,101
It has been suggested that ethical infrastructure in this area might include 
internal law firm controls on the use of certain litigation tactics. This would 
apply, for example, to certain types of motions to a court that have been 
identified as often being used for solely tactical purposes (for example, motions 
to disqualify a lawyer on the other side, or to seek personal costs orders against 
a lawyer). A firm could require that a litigation lawyer could not initiate that 
type of motion until its proposed use had been ethically reviewed by another 
lawyer in the firm from a different section who is not involved in the case to 
 and 
would set billable hours targets for lawyers with a view to them being 
achievable without padding or unreasonable working hours. 
Litigation is one area of practice that can raise particularly difficult ethical 
issues - that are not able to be easily resolved by the application of conduct 
rules and the law of lawyering - particularly in relation to obligations in 
discovery, not misleading the court or the other side, and excessive use of 
adversarial litigation tactics. This is one area where the problems of no-one 
taking responsibility for ethical evaluation of advice given and actions taken 
can be very real. These difficulties may exist despite formal policies that value 
ethics, because informal work team cultures and incentives promote aggressive 
adversarialism to advance client interests. 
                                                          
99 It is implicit in the whole of the regulatory structure, and consistently endorsed by the courts, that lawyers 
should charge reasonable fees only, and clients can certainly challenge fees on the basis that they are not 
reasonable {Model Laws, ss 3.4.44). But there is currently no express obligation on lawyers to do so in the first 
place. See, eg, Veghelyi v The Law Society of New South Wales (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Court of Appeal, Kirby P, Mahoney and Priestley JJA, 6 October 1995) 6-7. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission suggested to the 2005 New South Wales Legal Fees Review Panel that, in accordance with the 
approach taken by the American Bar Association, an express requirement be enacted to do so, together with 
practice rules which give guidance on the calculation of a reasonable fee. See American Bar Association, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (3rd edition, 1996) rule 1.5; Legal Fees Review Panel, Report: 
Legal Costs in New South Wales (2005). All Australian states and territories are now expected to mandate 
reasonable charging practices under the emerging national Model Laws. 
100 Legal Fees Review Panel, above n 99. 
101 See, eg, Kate Gibbs, 'Hours of (Billable) Justice', Lawyers Weekly, (Sydney), 5 April 2007, 18-9; Chris 
Merritt, 'Fixed-price Contracts Give Billable Hours the Elbow', The Australian, (Sydney) 3 November 2006, 24. 
make sure that it is being appropriately used.102
It has also been suggested that special care be taken to make sure that 
personnel are rotated where there is a lot of work being done for one client over 
a long period of time
 
103, and that law firms require their clients to formally 
assure them as part of discovery processes that no documents that might be 
considered relevant have been withheld or destroyed.104 Another step would be 
for firms to periodically evaluate or 'audit' different work teams' carriage of 
litigation in the past to see whether ethical standards could be improved. This 
could involve asking clients, and even the other side, whether they perceived 
any ethical problems in how the law firm lawyers behaved as well as having an 
independent team review the material documenting the decisions made 
throughout the case.105
The 'ethical infrastructure' of a firm is not just about the formal ethics policies 
enunciated by management. As we have seen, other formal and informal 
management policies and work team cultures will also either undermine or 
support ethical practice. Putting in place formal ethical infrastructures will not 
 
 
IV CONCLUSION: THE DANGERS OF BUREAUCRATISING ETHICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Informal collegial controls that might have worked in a previous context to 
support ethical behaviour are now being undermined by new, more 
bureaucratised management structures that lack any ethics focus. To the extent 
that larger law firms bureaucratise the way they deliver services to clients, they 
should also concern themselves with their ethical infrastructure. There is 
potential for management systems that are not explicitly designed to encourage 
ethical behaviour to actually discourage it. This is ultimately unsustainable in 
terms of its effects on ethical behaviour in the firm, and also on the culture and 
reputation of the firm as a whole - since ethical obligations to client and court 
or law are so central to legal service delivery. If firms do not develop effective 
ethical infrastructures, regulators may step in and impose their own 
requirements. 
Despite the great opportunity to promote positive ethical cultures within law 
firms through implementing ethical infrastructures, there is also, however, a 
danger that regulators and law firm management will be satisfied with 
symbolic or formalistic ethics management initiatives that do not make any 
difference to everyday actions and behaviours, and are not supported by 
commitment to ethical values by lawyers throughout each firm. 
                                                          
102 Nelson, above n 27, 789. 
103 See Corbin, above n 42, 288. 
104 Nelson, above n 27, 807. Note that the Australian Law Reform Commission's recently proposed requirement 
that lawyers sign off on privilege claims goes some way towards this suggestion: Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Privilege in Perspective, above n 12. 
105 Nelson, above n 27, 806. See also Fortney, 'Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves?' above n 82. 
necessarily mean that lawyers within the firm will use them as intended. For 
example, research has suggested that associates will still be reluctant to 
question the conduct of partners, even if guaranteed confidentiality.106
There is also a danger that ethical infrastructure initiatives will be narrowly 
designed to enforce compliance only with lawyers' clearest and most visible 
legal obligations (often duties to the client, including trust account separation, 
rather than duties to the court and the legal system as a whole), but that they 
will fail to support or encourage the development of individual lawyers' 
awareness of their own ethical values and ethical judgment as to how to apply 
them in practice. The application of moral theory to lawyers' ethics suggests 
that a crucial aspect of individual lawyers' expression of their own ethical 
values and judgment should be a law firm context in which lawyers are 
encouraged and empowered to individually and together deliberate over what 
ethics requires of them in different situations - and then, importantly, to put the 
outcomes of those deliberations into practice.
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There is a particular danger that in an increasingly commercialised and 
bureaucratised law firm environment, ethical infrastructure initiatives will 
major on spelling out and enforcing 'beyond compliance' devotion to clients, 
but minor on lawyers' overriding, ethical obligations to the court and the law. 
These latter obligations are often more vague in current expressions of 
professional conduct rules. Identifying situations where the duty to the court 
and the law are at risk often requires greater awareness by individual lawyers 
of their own values and greater sensitivity to the interests and values of other 
stakeholders in a situation. Working out how to avoid breaching duties to the 
court and the law in the face of client demands or commercial pressures is also 
likely to require much open discussion, contextual ethical judgment, and 
imaginative leadership. It will be difficult to lay down bright line rules.
 Formal policies must support 
this, for example by allowing time sheet options for ethical discussion, but 
cannot create such a culture without imaginative leadership. 
108
It may be hard to persuade everyone that this sort of process is productive and 
positive for the firm's growth. But law firm ethical infrastructures will only be 
useful if everyone within the firm is explicitly encouraged to raise ethical 
issues so that ethical problems can be identified, discussed and resolved - and 
 
                                                          
106 Chambliss, above n 30, 148-9, citing Robert Nelson, 'Uncivil Litigation: Problematic Behaviour in Large 
Law Firms' (1997) 8 Journal of Kansas Bar Association 8, 24. 
107 See, eg, Adrian Evans and Josephine Palermo, 'Preparing Australia's Future Lawyers: An 
Exposition of Changing Values Over Time in the Context of Teaching About Ethical Dilemmas' 
(2006) 11 Deakin Law Review 103; Reid Mortensen, 'Agency, Autonomy and a Theology for Legal 
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108 Sec Chambliss, above n 30, 147 (suggesting that some types of ethical issues will respond 
better to more formal processes within a firm, for example, potential trust account breaches, while 
informal, social processes are more conducive to resolving others, for example, time costing and 
discovery). 
 
people are not punished for raising them in the first place. Any discussion of 
ethical issues is desirable. Not only does it increase the likelihood of more 
ethical decisions in individual cases, but if the process includes not only 
upward communication, but also neutral dialogue with colleagues109
• Awareness and understanding by individual lawyers of:  
 - 'the 
ability to sound others out' as it were - this will itself heighten and broaden the 
level of moral sensitivity within the organisation, and also lower the levels of 
stress experienced by individual decision makers. 
The most important aspects of ethical infrastructure are less tangible than 
management systems for ensuring compliance with ethical rules. They have 
much more to do with the way the culture of the law firm connects with and 
empowers individual lawyers to express their own ethics and values in their 
work, especially by feeling free to raise ethical issues with colleagues and 
superiors - and have those queries taken seriously, discussed and, where 
necessary, acted on. 
In law firm practice, individual ethical lawyers cannot do without an ethically 
supportive firm structure. Equally, ethical structures are less than effective 
without individual lawyers who personally commit to ethical practice. Ethical 
infrastructure must be aimed at promoting an ethical practice that involves: 
• Their own personal values110
• The range of different approaches to ethical decision-making; 
 
• The standards set out in the rules and law on professional conduct 
(trying to follow the rules is just one approach to ethical 
decision-making); 
• Their own preferred ethical approach ('ethical position'); 
• Day-to-day situations where ethical issues may arise; 
• Informal signals in legal practice of the risk of unethical conduct; 
and, 
• The ability to identify them when they occur. 
• A capacity and willingness by individual lawyers to: 
• Discuss their own ethical position with others in the firm; 
• Seek to understand the ethical position of others within the firm; 
• Make  a judgment  about  competing  ethical  positions   in  
                                                          
109 Frederick Bird, The Muled Conscience: Moral Silence and the Practice of Ethics in Business 
(1996) 25. 
110 It is likely to be the case that the longer an individual has been part of the current finn, the more he or 
she has internalised the values of the firm. It has also been suggested that 'ethical imprinting' occurs 
within the first experience of law practice and does not necessarily change with the current firm: 
Chambliss, 'The Nirvana Fallacy', above n 30, 149, citing Leslie C Levin, 'The Ethical World of Solo and 
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Palermo, 'Lawyers and Ethics in Practice: The Impact of Clinical and Ethics Curricula on Lawyers' 
Ethical Decision-Making', in 'Monograph No I -Innovation in Clinical Legal Education: Educating 
Future Lawyers' (2007) Alternative Law Journal II. 
complex situations; and 
• Act on that judgment. 
• An environment within the law firm in which all staff (lawyers and support 
staff) are encouraged to, and do, discuss with their colleagues ethical 
questions about their own work and work within the firm more generally. 
• This 'ethical conversation' is viewed in the firm in a positive, aspirational 
light and as an opportunity to improve the way the firm operates, and is 
seen as a proactive, natural part of the way the practice chooses to operate. 
It is not seen simply as a reaction to 'compliance management', and the 
firm aims to transcend oppressive, punitive overtones associated with 
terminology such as 'regulation', 'compliance', 'performance management', 
and 'whistleblowing'. At the very least, those who do raise ethical 
questions do not face recriminations, even where this has the potential to 
displease a client or have adverse financial consequences for the firm. 
• The existence within the  firm  of ethically  supportive  structures  
and management practices. 
It should not be a question of relying on either formal or informal processes; it 
is appropriate that firms have both legalistic, formal reporting procedures to 
deal with ethical breaches involving those members of the firm who are 
'beyond the reach of soft, cultural controls',111
   
 while simultaneously 
encouraging a culture of open, two-way dialogue and mutual support. 
 
                                                          
111 Chambliss, above n 30, 128, . 
 





Appendix 1: The 'Ten Commandments' for Incorporated Legal Practices"112
 
The ten areas to be addressed to demonstrate compliance with the 'Appropriate 
Management Systems' requirement for incorporated law firms as required by 
the NSW Legal Services Commissioner. It is understood that the same 
approach will be followed in Victoria and Queensland. 
 
(1)    Negligence - (providing for competent work practices). 
(2)     Communication (providing for effective, timely and courteous 
communication). 
(3)     Delay (providing for timely review, delivery and follow up of legal 
services). 
(4)     Liens/file transfers (providing for timely resolution of document/file 
transfers). 
(5)     Cost disclosure/billing practices/termination of retainer (providing for 
shared understanding and appropriate documentation n commencement and 
termination of retainer along with appropriate billing practices during the 
retainer). 
(6)     Conflict of interests (providing for timely identification and resolution 
of "conflict of interests", including when acting for both parties or acting 
against previous clients as well as potential conflicts which may arise in 
relationships with debt collectors and mercantile agencies, or conducting 
another business, referral fees and commissions etc). 
(7)     Records management (minimising the likelihood of loss or destruction 
of correspondence and documents through appropriate document retention, 
filing, archiving etc and providing for compliance with requirements regarding 
registers of files, safe custody, financial interests). 
(8)    Undertakings (providing for undertakings to be given, monitoring of 
compliance and timely compliance with notices, orders, rulings, directions or 
other requirements of regulatory authorities such as the OLSC, courts, costs 
assessors). 
(9)     Supervision of practice and staff (providing for compliance with 
statutory obligations covering licence and practising certificate conditions, 
employment of persons and providing for proper quality assurance of 
 
work outputs and performance of legal, paralegal and non-legal staff 
                                                          
112 Ten areas to be addressed to demonstrate compliance with 'Appropriate Management Systems' 
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_tenobjectives> at 6 August 
2007. 
 
involved in the delivery of legal services). 
(10) Trust account regulations (providing for compliance with Part 3.1 
Division 2 of the Legal Profession Act and proper accounting 
procedures). 
